When and how much to talk credibility and flexibility in monetary policy with private information
- 30 April 1995
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Monetary Economics
- Vol. 35 (2) , 341-357
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(95)01193-r
Abstract
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This publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
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