Abstract
Cet article analyse les programmes hongrois et polonais de recapitalisation bancaire mis en œuvre depuis 1992 et les réintègre dans le processus plus long de restructuration des systèmes financiers. On montre notamment comment ils ont eu des effets nettement opposés en raison principalement de dispositifs divergents de contraintes et d'incitations micro-économiques. Il apparaît, en particulier, que le risque d'aléa moral est renforcé, dans le contexte de la transition, par la situation de capture des banques par les grandes entreprises, et plus généralement par la résistance de nombreux agents au renforcement des contraintes concurrentielles et financières.This paper presents the Hungarian and Polish bank recapitalization programs implemented since 1992 and put them in the longer term perspective of the restructuring of financial systems. Their opposite results are linked to diverging schemes of microeconomic constraints and incentives. It is also shown that the risk of moral hazard, which is present in any intervention of this kind, is strongly reinforced in the transition context : this is due to a situation where banks are often captured by large public enterprises, and, more generally, to the strong resistance opposed by many agents to the hardenning of the com­petitive and financial constraints put upon them

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