The balance of power in closely held corporations
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Open Access
- 1 January 2000
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 58 (1-2) , 113-139
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00068-4
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This publication has 12 references indexed in Scilit:
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