Historical Accounting and the Endogenous Credibility of Current Disclosures
Preprint
- 1 January 1999
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
In this paper I examine how an untimely mandatory accounting system -- one that gives an accurate report of past value -- can enhance the credibility of a firm'Keywords
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