Cheap Talk, Fraud and Adverse Selection in Financial Markets: Some Experimental Evidence
Preprint
- 1 January 1998
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We examine communication in two-player games that represent simplified financial markets with asymmetric information. In each game, a seller knows the true qualKeywords
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