Modeling Rational Players: Part II
- 1 April 1988
- journal article
- essays
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Economics and Philosophy
- Vol. 4 (1) , 9-55
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267100000328
Abstract
This is the second part of a two-part paper. It can be read independently of the first part provided that the reader is prepared to go along with the unorthodox views on game theory which were advanced in Part I and are summarized below. The body of the paper is an attempt to study some of the positive implications of such a viewpoint. This requires an exploration of what is involved in modeling “rational players” as computing machines.Keywords
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