A note on uncertainty and cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
- 1 September 1987
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 16 (3) , 187-195
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01756290
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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