Variation in the Monitoring Incentives of Outside Stockholders
- 1 October 2006
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 49 (2) , 651-680
- https://doi.org/10.1086/505368
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 39 references indexed in Scilit:
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