Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long‐Term Perspective
Top Cited Papers
- 17 December 2001
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 56 (6) , 2265-2297
- https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00405
Abstract
We report evidence on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover during the 1971 to 1994 period. We find that the nature of CEO turnover activity has changed over time. The frequencies of forced CEO turnover and outside succession both increased. However, the relation between the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and firm performance did not change significantly from the beginning to the end of the period we examine, despite substantial changes in internal governance mechanisms. The evidence also indicates that changes in the intensity of the takeover market are not associated with changes in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.Keywords
This publication has 28 references indexed in Scilit:
- Do outside directors monitor managers?: Evidence from tender offer bidsPublished by Elsevier ,2002
- Managerial discipline and corporate restructuring following performance declinesJournal of Financial Economics, 2000
- The motivation and impact of pension fund activismJournal of Financial Economics, 1999
- The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA‐CREFThe Journal of Finance, 1998
- Outside Directors and CEO SelectionJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1996
- Performance Changes Following Top Management DismissalsThe Journal of Finance, 1995
- Poison or placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measuresJournal of Financial Economics, 1995
- SICs as Delineators of Economic MarketsThe Journal of Business, 1989
- ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE AS AN ANTECEDENT OF INSIDE/OUTSIDE CHIEF EXECUTIVE SUCCESSION: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT.The Academy of Management Journal, 1985
- Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performanceJournal of Accounting and Economics, 1985