Modeling Rational Players: Part I
- 1 October 1987
- journal article
- essays
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Economics and Philosophy
- Vol. 3 (2) , 179-214
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267100002893
Abstract
Game theory has proved a useful tool in the study of simple economic models. However, numerous foundational issues remain unresolved. The situation is particularly confusing in respect of the non-cooperative analysis of games with some dynamic structure in which the choice of one move or another during the play of the game may convey valuable information to the other players. Without pausing for breath, it is easy to name at least 10 rival equilibrium notions for which a serious case can be made that here is the “right” solution concept for such games.Keywords
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