SECURITY OF FISSILE MATERIALS IN RUSSIA
- 1 November 1996
- journal article
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Energy and the Environment
- Vol. 21 (1) , 467-496
- https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.energy.21.1.467
Abstract
▪ Abstract The problem of security of huge stocks of weapons-usable highly enriched uranium and plutonium in Russia against theft or diversion remains a serious nonproliferation concern. During the Cold War, the security of Soviet nuclear materials was based on centralization and discipline, protection by the military, and intrusive political oversight of the people. The recent fundamental societal changes have rendered these arrangements inadequate, and the security of nuclear materials has decreased. Safeguarding nuclear materials in Russia is particularly difficult because of their very large inventories and the size and complexity of the nation's nuclear infrastructure. Russia needs a reliable and more objective technology-based system of nuclear safeguards designed to control nuclear materials. The Russian government and the international community are working towards this goal.Keywords
This publication has 7 references indexed in Scilit:
- Fissile Material Security in the Post-Cold-War WorldPhysics Today, 1995
- “Potatoes were guarded better”Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1995
- U.S.‐Russian cooperation in the area of nuclear safeguardsThe Nonproliferation Review, 1994
- How the Bomb Saved Soviet PhysicsBulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1994
- Integration of the military and civilian nuclear fuel cycles in RussiaScience & Global Security, 1994
- The U.S.‐Russian HEU agreement: Internal safeguards to prevent diversion of HEUScience & Global Security, 1994
- Detecting nuclear warheadsScience & Global Security, 1990