The complexity of computing a best response automaton in repeated games with mixed strategies
- 1 March 1990
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 2 (1) , 1-12
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90010-r
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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