Intuitions and Individual Differences: The Knobe Effect Revisited
- 13 August 2007
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
- Vol. 22 (4) , 346-365
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2007.00312.x
Abstract
Abstract: Recent work by Joshua Knobe indicates that people’s intuition about whether an action wasintentionaldepends on whether the outcome is good or bad. This paper argues that part of the explanation for this effect is that there are stable individual differences in how ‘intentional’ is interpreted. That is, in Knobe’s cases, different people interpret the term in different ways. Thisinterpretive diversityof ‘intentional’ opens up a new avenue to help explain Knobe’s results. Furthermore, the paper argues that the use of intuitions in philosophy is complicated by fact that there are robust individual differences in intuitions about matters of philosophical concern.Keywords
This publication has 23 references indexed in Scilit:
- Acting Intentionally and the Side-Effect EffectPsychological Science, 2006
- Theory of mind and moral cognition: exploring the connectionsTrends in Cognitive Sciences, 2005
- Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind*Philosophy of Science, 2005
- Semantics, cross-cultural styleCognition, 2004
- Jackson's Empirical Assumptions*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2001
- ResponsesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2001
- The mapping between the mental and the public lexiconPublished by Cambridge University Press (CUP) ,1998
- Intention and Intentional Action: The Simple View*Mind & Language, 1986
- The effects of statistical training on thinking about everyday problemsCognitive Psychology, 1986
- Rationality and the Range of IntentionMidwest Studies in Philosophy, 1986