International lending of last resort and moral hazard: A model of IMF's catalytic finance
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- 1 April 2006
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Monetary Economics
- Vol. 53 (3) , 441-471
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.03.008
Abstract
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