Renegotiation in repeated games
- 1 December 1989
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 1 (4) , 327-360
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90021-3
Abstract
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All Related Versions
This publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
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