Legislatures, Initiatives, and Representation: The Effects of State Legislative Institutions on Policy
- 1 June 1996
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Research Quarterly
- Vol. 49 (2) , 263-286
- https://doi.org/10.1177/106591299604900202
Abstract
Policy advocates in many states may pursue their policy agendas either by traditional legislative politics or by direct legislation. I show that this choice matters: policy outcomes resulting from direct legislation often reflect dif ferent interests than policy outcomes resulting from the legislative process, even on similar issues. Using data from California statewide elections, I analyze policies that were considered in both the legislative process and the direct legislation process, and for which the two processes led to differ ent outcomes. I demonstrate that features of the legislature, especially party organization, can induce individual legislators to vote against their district majority preference. In the aggregate, these influences are shown to lead legislative and direct legislation outcomes to diverge.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 20 references indexed in Scilit:
- Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative RedistrictingAmerican Political Science Review, 1994
- An Empirical Investigation of the Dynamics of PAC ContributionsAmerican Journal of Political Science, 1994
- Endogenous Preferences and the Study of InstitutionsAmerican Political Science Review, 1993
- Constituency Influence on House Roll-Call Votes in the Progressive Era, 1913-1915Legislative Studies Quarterly, 1993
- Long-Term Investing in Politicians; Or, Give Early, Give OftenThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1992
- COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS, CONSTITUENT PREFERENCES, AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONSEconomic Inquiry, 1991
- Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional CommitteesAmerican Political Science Review, 1990
- Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to RayburnAmerican Political Science Review, 1981
- Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of InstitutionsAmerican Political Science Review, 1980
- Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting ModelsAmerican Journal of Political Science, 1979