How powerful are public bureaucrats as voters?
- 1 January 1982
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 38 (3) , 253-262
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00144851
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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