The Nature of Discipline by Corporate Takeovers
- 1 August 2004
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 59 (4) , 1511-1552
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00671.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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