INTEREST GROUPS, ELECTORAL COMPETITION, AND PROBABILISTIC VOTING FOR TRADE POLICIES*
- 1 March 1994
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economics & Politics
- Vol. 6 (1) , 59-77
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1994.tb00084.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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