Correlated Types and Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms with Budget Balance
- 1 March 1998
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 79 (1) , 142-151
- https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2366
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 7 references indexed in Scilit:
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