Allocating bank regulatory powers: Lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision
- 1 November 2005
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 49 (8) , 2107-2136
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.10.004
Abstract
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