What Drives Deregulation? Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions
- 1 November 1999
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 114 (4) , 1437-1467
- https://doi.org/10.1162/003355399556223
Abstract
This paper investigates private-interest, public-interest, and political-institutional theories of regulatory change to analyze state-level deregulatKeywords
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