Slavery and Supervision in Comparative Perspective: A Model
- 1 September 1984
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Journal of Economic History
- Vol. 44 (3) , 635-668
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022050700032307
Abstract
The familiar transaction-costs model is extended to allow for the varying costs and benefits of supervision and pain incentives on the one hand, and ordinary rewards on the other, in differentially effort- and care-intensive activities. Applied to unfree labor, this model accounts for the observed patterns of slave governance and manumission in extractive, industrial, agricultural, and service activities in antiquity and in the New World. Applied to free labor, it accounts for wage work on large estates in labor-surplus medieval England or modern Italy, the choice between bonuses and penalties in industrial contracts, and the growing paternalism of our own time.Keywords
This publication has 38 references indexed in Scilit:
- Book ReviewsSexualities, 1998
- FORCED AND FREE LABOUR IN LATE COLONIAL POTOSIPast & Present, 1981
- Slaves as Fixed Capital: Slave Labor and Southern Economic DevelopmentJournal of American History, 1977
- Slavery, Incentives, and Manumission: A Theoretical ModelJournal of Political Economy, 1975
- The Optimal Utilization of SlavesThe Journal of Economic History, 1975
- LatifundiaBulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, 1967
- The Economics of Slavery in the Ante Bellum South: Another CommentJournal of Political Economy, 1960
- Manumission by PurchaseThe Journal of Negro History, 1948
- I. Les capitalistes romains et la viticulture italienneAnnales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales, 1947
- Comment et pourquoi finit l'esclavage antiqueAnnales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales, 1947