Why reputation favors joint ventures over vertical and horizontal integration A simple model
- 1 December 1995
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 28 (3) , 387-397
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(95)00042-9
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
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