A test of the core solution in finite strategy non-sidepayment games
- 31 October 1984
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 8 (2) , 141-168
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(84)90012-x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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