A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma
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- 1 January 2002
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 102 (1) , 84-105
- https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2774
Abstract
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This publication has 17 references indexed in Scilit:
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