CENTRAL BANK REPUTATION AND THE MONETIZATION OF DEFICITS: THE 1981 ITALIAN MONETARY REFORM
- 1 April 1987
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 25 (2) , 185-200
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1987.tb00734.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
- Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary PolicyEconometrica, 1987
- Money, debt and deficits in a dynamic gameJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 1986
- Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric InformationPublished by National Bureau of Economic Research ,1986
- Reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete informationJournal of Monetary Economics, 1986
- Central Bank Behavior and Credibility: Some Recent Theoretical DevelopmentsPublished by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis ,1986
- Debt, Deficits, and Finite HorizonsJournal of Political Economy, 1985
- Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capitalJournal of Monetary Economics, 1983
- Reputation and imperfect informationJournal of Economic Theory, 1982
- Time consistency and optimal government policies in perfect foresight equilibriumJournal of Public Economics, 1980