Incentives for CEOs with multitasks: Evidence from Chinese state-owned enterprises
- 26 April 2005
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Comparative Economics
- Vol. 33 (3) , 517-539
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2005.03.013
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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