Explanatory Pluralism and Macro-Causation
- 1 December 2001
- journal article
- other
- Published by SAGE Publications in Theory & Psychology
- Vol. 11 (6) , 761-772
- https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354301116003
Abstract
Contemporary reductionism nowadays comes in various strengths and flavors, ranging from restricted claims concerning the token identity of physical and mental events up to the more orthodox claims about the reducibility of psychological laws. This paper first provides a taxonomy of different versions of reductionism arranged in order of decreasing strength. Against this backdrop it is argued that classical arguments in favor of an absolute autonomy of psychology and of the special sciences fall far short of their intended conclusion. Instead the paper develops what it takes to be more promising arguments based on the notion of multiple supervenience that underwrite the notion of explanatory pluralism and make room for a systems account of higher-order processes sanctioning downward causation without violating the laws of micro-physics.Keywords
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