Regulatory distortion of management compensation: The case of golden parachutes for bank managers
- 30 June 1997
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 21 (6) , 825-848
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0378-4266(97)00004-6
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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