D-Minus Elections: The Politics and Norms of International Election Observation
Top Cited Papers
- 1 April 2009
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 63 (4) , 765-787
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818309990117
Abstract
As international election monitors have grown active worldwide, their announcements have gained influence. Sometimes, however, they endorse highly flawed elections. Because their leverage rests largely on their credibility, this is puzzling. Understanding the behavior of election monitors is important because they help the international community to evaluate the legitimacy of governments and because their assessments inform the data used by scholars to study democracy. Furthermore, election monitors are also particularly instructive to study because the variety of both intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations that observe elections makes it possible to compare them across many countries and political contexts. This study uses a new dataset of 591 international election-monitoring missions. It shows that despite their official mandate to focus on election norms, monitors do not only consider the elections' quality; their assessments also reflect the interests of their member states or donors as well as other tangential organizational norms. Thus, even when accounting as best as possible for the nature and level of irregularities in an election, monitors' concerns about democracy promotion, violent instability, and organizational politics and preferences are associated with election endorsement. The study also reveals differences in the behavior of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations and explains why neither can pursue their core objectives single-mindedly.Keywords
This publication has 38 references indexed in Scilit:
- The More the Merrier? The Effects of Having Multiple International Election Monitoring OrganizationsPerspectives on Politics, 2009
- The Scope of IMF ConditionalityInternational Organization, 2008
- Battle over the box: international election observation missions, political competition and retrenchment in the post-Soviet spaceInternational Affairs, 2006
- The Backlash against Democracy PromotionForeign Affairs, 2006
- Constitutional Structures, Sovereignty, and the Emergence of Norms: The Case of International Election MonitoringInternational Organization, 2005
- Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental ReformInternational Organization, 2003
- Elections Without Democracy: The Menu of ManipulationJournal of Democracy, 2002
- Merchants of MoralityForeign Policy, 2002
- Testing Models of U.S. Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid during and after the Cold WarThe Journal of Politics, 1998
- The Rise of Illiberal DemocracyForeign Affairs, 1997