Efficiency in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring
- 1 October 1997
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 76 (2) , 345-361
- https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2313
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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