Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: an old argument in new garb
- 1 December 1998
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 70 (3) , 399-424
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(98)00042-5
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
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