Crucial issues concerning central bank independence
- 30 June 1997
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Monetary Economics
- Vol. 39 (1) , 99-112
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-3932(97)00007-x
Abstract
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