Ostracism in work teams: a public good experiment
- 1 November 2003
- journal article
- Published by Emerald Publishing in International Journal of Manpower
- Vol. 24 (7) , 867-887
- https://doi.org/10.1108/01437720310502177
Abstract
This paper provides an experimental examination of the effects of ostracism on cooperation. Ostracism is one of the most radical forms of peer pressure. More generally, ostracism is the exclusion of disapproved individuals from interaction with a social group. By performing a laboratory experiment involving a public good game with exclusion, the paper provides empirical evidence that threats of exclusion increase contributions. The results show that subjects exclude their peers for two reasons. Subjects are willing to punish unfair behaviors (non-strategic reason) and expect changes in behavior in response to exclusions (strategic reason).Keywords
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