Expressive Law And Economics
- 1 June 1998
- journal article
- conference paper
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Legal Studies
- Vol. 27 (S2) , 585-607
- https://doi.org/10.1086/468036
Abstract
This article develops an economic theory of expressive law. By expressing social values, law can tip a system of social norms into a new equilibrium. This process can create or destroy a social norm without changing individual values. In addition, law can change the individual values of rational people. Internalizing a social norm is a moral commitment that attaches a psychological penalty to a forbidden act. A rational person internalizes a norm when commitment conveys an advantage relative to the original preferences and the changed preferences. I call such a commitment a "Pareto self-improvement." By creating opportunities for Pareto self-improvements, law induces rational people to change their preferences. Inducing change in this way respects individual preferences, rather favoring a particular moral theory.All Related Versions
This publication has 4 references indexed in Scilit:
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