Public-Good Provision with Many Participants
- 1 July 2003
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Economic Studies
- Vol. 70 (3) , 589-614
- https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00257
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
- Pivotal Players and the Characterization of InfluenceJournal of Economic Theory, 2000
- A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public GoodsEconometrica, 1999
- Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods MechanismsThe Review of Economic Studies, 1994
- Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many AgentsThe Review of Economic Studies, 1990
- Dissolving a Partnership EfficientlyEconometrica, 1987
- The private supply of a public goodJournal of Economics, 1986
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral tradingJournal of Economic Theory, 1983
- Optimal Auction DesignMathematics of Operations Research, 1981
- Incentives and incomplete informationJournal of Public Economics, 1979
- The design of tax structure: Direct versus indirect taxationJournal of Public Economics, 1976