Pivotal Players and the Characterization of Influence
- 1 June 2000
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 92 (2) , 318-342
- https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2605
Abstract
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