When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?
- 1 March 1998
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 79 (1) , 46-71
- https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2373
Abstract
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