The all‐too‐flexible abductive method: ATOM's normative status
- 16 July 2008
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Clinical Psychology
- Vol. 64 (9) , 1023-1036
- https://doi.org/10.1002/jclp.20516
Abstract
The author discusses the abductive theory of method (ATOM) by Brian Haig from a philosophical perspective, connecting his theory with a number of issues and trends in contemporary philosophy of science. It is argued that as it stands, the methodology presented by Haig is too permissive. Both the use of analogical reasoning and the application of exploratory factor analysis leave us with too many candidate theories to choose from, and explanatory coherence cannot be expected to save the day. The author ends with some suggestions to remedy the permissiveness and lack of normative force in ATOM, deriving from the experimental practice within which psychological data are produced. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. J Clin Psychol 64:1–14, 2008.Keywords
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