Mixed strategies and iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies: an experimental investigation of states of knowledge
- 1 June 2000
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 42 (4) , 483-521
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00101-3
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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