Floor Behavior in the U.S. Congress: Committee Power Under the Open Rule
- 1 September 1989
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 83 (3) , 795-815
- https://doi.org/10.2307/1962061
Abstract
The open rule in the House is a complex set of restrictions, limiting, for example, the number of motions and the order of recognition. By incorporating constraints based on the actual set of rules into a model, I show that legislative outcomes appear more predictable than was previously thought. These rules nearly always allow the proponents of legislation to respond to an opponent's amendment, mitigating the potential damage of the latter. An advantage of the approach is that it provides a new interpretation of the changes in floor activity observed in the postreform period.Keywords
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