PUBLIC GOODS, RENT DISSIPATION, AND CANDIDATE COMPETITION*
- 1 July 1990
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economics & Politics
- Vol. 2 (2) , 115-132
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1990.tb00026.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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