It's What You Say, Not What You Pay: An Experimental Study of Manager-Employee Relationships in Overcoming Coordination Failure
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- 1 December 2007
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 5 (6) , 1223-1268
- https://doi.org/10.1162/jeea.2007.5.6.1223
Abstract
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