Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations: An experimental study
- 1 December 2006
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 9 (4) , 407-423
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-7056-5
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
- It's What You Say, Not What You Pay: An Experimental Study of Manager-Employee Relationships in Overcoming Coordination FailureJournal of the European Economic Association, 2007
- A Change Would Do You Good .... An Experimental Study on How to Overcome Coordination Failure in OrganizationsAmerican Economic Review, 2006
- The Impact of Simple Institutions in Experimental Economies with Poverty TrapsSSRN Electronic Journal, 2005
- Imitation of successful behaviour in cournot marketsThe Economic Journal, 2003
- The impact of meaningful context on strategic play in signaling gamesJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2003
- Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly ExperimentThe Review of Economic Studies, 2002
- Firm‐Wide Incentives and Mutual Monitoring at Continental AirlinesJournal of Labor Economics, 2001
- Does information about competitors’ actions increase or decrease competition in experimental oligopoly markets?International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2000
- Creating Expectational Assets in the Laboratory: Coordination in ‘Weakest-Link’ GamesStrategic Management Journal, 1994
- Problems of Industrialisation of Eastern and South-Eastern EuropeThe Economic Journal, 1943