Concealing and confounding adverse signals: insider wealth-maximizing behavior in the IPO process
- 10 December 2002
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 67 (1) , 149-172
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00234-9
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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