Regulatory errors, optimal fines and the level of compliance
- 1 March 1995
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 56 (3) , 475-484
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(94)01423-l
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit:
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