Abstract
This paper examines the impact of political and economic liberalization on regional conflict and cooperation. It concludes that: (1) even if democracy may be expected to have a positive effect on cooperation, it may be neither necessary nor sufficient; (2) instead, the grand political-economic strategies of domestic ruling coalitions may provide a more powerful predictor of regional outcomes. Coalitions strongly committed to economic liberalization are expected to be more likely to undertake regional cooperative postures, particularly when facing similarly committed regional partners. Coalitions aggregating inward-looking and big-state interests - often allied with confessional movements - are expected to endorse less cooperative positions vis-a-vis regional partners. I discuss the genesis of alternative coalitions, the impact of their political strength and interactive dynamics on regional outcomes and end with the implications of this coalitional framework for extant theories and for future research. The conceptual advantages of focusing on coalitions include providing a unifying framework for comparing different regions, transcending old level-of-analysis categories, explaining intra- as well as inter-state competition, and eschewing exceptionalist theories of Third World behavior.

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