Optimal Incentive Contracts When Agents Can Save, Borrow, and Default
- 31 October 1999
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Intermediation
- Vol. 8 (4) , 241-269
- https://doi.org/10.1006/jfin.1999.0275
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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