Cooperation Theory and Disarmament Negotiations in the 1950s

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Abstract
Soviet-American disarmament negotiations of the mid-1950s provide a critical case for evaluating theories of cooperation such as Tit-for-Tat and GRIT. Although both sides were close to agreement on the main terms of a treaty by May 1955, the negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful. On the basis of declassified U.S. documents, it now appears that the U.S. did not favor an agreement at the time: thus the game was not Prisoners' Dilemma, but Deadlock. The case reinforces the criticism of Tit-for-Tat that its unitary actor assumption ignores domestic second-image pressures for arming, and it also calls into question “first-image” explanations, such as GRIT, that focus on individual cognitive barriers to cooperation. The importance of understanding the links between internal political coalitions and external bargaining strategies is emphasized.